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SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL DELAY OF OVER TWO YEARS BETWEEN INITIAL
ARREST AND TRIAL NOT PREJUDICIAL TO
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL.
State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544, cert. denied, 498
U.S. 841 (1990).

INTRODUCTION

I.

In State v. Bailey,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a split
decision, affirmed a drug conviction handed down over two years
after the defendant's initial arrest. In a liberal application of existing
precedent, the court reasoned that "the peculiar circumstances of
this case . . . were sufficient to outweigh . . . any prejudice, actual
and presumed, arising from the length of the delay."i In light of
Bailey, this Case note will examine how defendants in Maryland will
have to provide convincing evidence of actual prejudice if they are
to be successful when challenging convictions on grounds of pre-trial
delay.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . .. "3 Similar language appears in
article 21 of the Maryland Constitution,4 and statutory protections

l.
2.
3.
4.

319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841 (1990).
[d. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution provides:
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be
informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the
Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his
defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses
for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial
jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found
guilty.
MD. CONST. art. 2l.
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are provided under both federalS and state law. 6 The Supreme Court
has stated that this is a fundamental righF imposed on the states by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
The Due Process Clause itself provides additional protection of
an accused's right to a fair trial9 and is frequently invoked as an
alternative remedy when pre-trial delays are. involved. lO Defendants
5. Federal protections are provided in the Speedy Trial Act which states: "In any
case involving a defendant charged with an offense, the appropriate judicial
officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall ... set the case for trial on a
day certain ... so as to assure a speedy trial." Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(a) (1990).
6. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992), which provides:
(a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court:
(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:
(i) The appearance of counsel; or
(ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit
court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and
(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those
events.
(b) On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and for good
cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that
judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date.
(c) The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and
procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1990) (court must order dismissal if
there is no indictment within 15 days or trial does not commence in a Superior
Court within 60 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1980
& Supp. 1992) (every person in custody shall be tried within 120 days; if out
on bail or recognizance, within 160 days); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.556
(Michie 1992) (court may dismiss complaint if no indictment filed within 15
days; trial must occur within 60 days of the indictment); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-243 (Michie 1990) (where general district court finds probable cause of a
felony, case will be discharged if no trial is commenced within five months,
or nine months if defendant is not held in custody).
7. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 & n.2 (1972) (quoting Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967».
8. Barker, 470 U.S. at 515; see also Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222-23 (relying on
holding in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that Sixth Amendment
protections apply to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. The due process provisions of the Constitution are especially important protections against pre-indictment delay. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... OJ).
10. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (invoking Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause where delay of three years between indictment and
alleged illegal activity substantially prejudiced appellee's right to a fair trial);
see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (stating that undue
delay after charges are dismissed may be examined under the Due Process
Clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226-27 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating preference to decide case by relying on Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the speedy trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment).
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may petition the courts for relief under this provision when the Sixth
Amendment guarantee has not attached or is inapplicable. II
Earlier in this century, the Supreme Court recognized that the
right to a speedy trial relates to the context and the circumstances
surrounding the case and "the rights of public justice." 12 The right
is unusual in that it serves interests of society which may, at times,
be in opposition to those of the accused.13 For example, a delay in
bringing an accused to trial may actually work to his advantage if
the state's case largely depends on a witness who may become
unavailable with the passage of time. For this reason, delay is often
used as a defense tactic, and deprivation of the right is not considered
per se prejudicial to the accused's ability to adequately defend
himself. 14 Because the Sixth Amendment guarantee is itself indicative
that delay is often detrimental to the defendant, any "purposeful or
oppressive" prosecutorial delay which is used to harass or hamper
the defense is considered improper and invokes the constitutional
protections. IS
The right to a speedy trial is also different from other constitutional rights because it is "impossible to pinpoint a precise time in
the process when the right must be asserted."16 Consequently, it is
"impossible to determine with [any] precision when the right has
[actually] been denied."17 Thus, an accurate assessment of a speedy
trial claim depends not on some bright line rule but necessitates an
inquir:Y into the context of each particular case and set of circumstances. IS
Although the speedy trial provision is a single constitutionallygranted shield, it protects at least three separate but related interests
of the defendant: (1) avoiding undue and oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern brought on by public
accusation; and (3) limiting the possibility that delay will restrict the
accused's ability to effectively defend himself.19 The Supreme Court
has recognized these defense interests as the standards by which
prejudice is measured when a prosecutorial delay occurs. 20
. The right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Constitution

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
[d. at 521.
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 527.
[d. at 521.
[d. at 522.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); see John C. Godbold, Speedy
Trial - Major Surgery for a National III, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265, 268-72 (1972).
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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has been considered most notably in the context of delays during the
following periods: (1) between arrest and indictment;21 (2) after
indictment but prior to trial;22 (3) after trial but prior to sentencing;23
and (4) prior to retrial. 24 In Bailey, the situation involved somewhat
different circumstances in that the delay resulted from the dismissal
of the initial indictment and a subsequent reindictment. This unusual
set of circumstances was due to a combination of the defendant's
criminal conviction in another jurisdiction and the state's desire to
enhance its case by gathering evidence for additional charges. 2s
In 1971, the Supreme Court clarified when the "speedy trial
clock" begins to tick. The Court reasoned in United States v.
Marion 26 that the speedy trial provision has no application until the
"defendant in some way became an accused. "27 The right thus
attaches at the time of arrest or upon the filing of formal charges,
whichever comes first. 28 Ten years later, in MacDonald v. United
States,29 the Court held that the defendant loses "accused" status
once charges are formally dropped. 30 Once charges have been dropped
in good faith, the speedy trial provision has no further application
until a reindictment. 31 Any delay occurring after such a dismissal,
and any remedy for such a delay, are considered under a due process
analysis rather than the Speedy Trial ClauseY If the prosecution

21. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (two year delay between
arrest and indictment).
22. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (holding that aggregate delay
of 22 months between arrest and indictment and 12 months between indictment
and trial was violative of defendant's right to a speedy trial).
23. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (two year delay between
trial and sentencing).
24. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1967) (holding that state
may not, without stated justification, indefinitely postpone reprosecution on
an indictment over the objection of an accused who has been discharged from
custody after a mistrial in the first prosecution).
25. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
26. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
27. [d. at 313.
28. [d. at 320.
29. 456 U.S. 1 (1982).
30. [d. at 8. Although MacDonald is similar to Bailey in that the charges against
both defendants were dropped, the MacDonald holding was considered and
distinguished by the court of special appeals. Bailey v. State, No. 88-737, slip
op. at 4-5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989) [available on microfiche as
part of the record extract filed with the briefs for· the appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990) (No.
89-75)]. Unlike in Bailey, however, the prosecution in MacDonald had no case
with which to move forward. The court of appeals evidently accepted this
rationale because the issue was not raised again.
31. [d. at 7 & n.7.
32. /d. at 7. Note, however, that Bailey was decided primarily on a Sixth Amend-
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drops charges with an improper motive, however, the speedy trial
right continues to apply. 33
Just six months after Marion, the United States Supreme Court
in Barker v. Wingo34 established a test to analyze the denial of the
right to a speedy trial. For the first time, the Court set the "criteria
by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. "35 In establishing
this criteria, the Court rejected two alternative approaches commonly
applied in the past: (1) trial required within a specified time period
and (2) a "demand/waiver" approach whereby a prior demand for
a speedy trial was a necessary condition to the consideration of the
right. 36 Because the Constitution does not specify a definite time
period for bringing an accused to trial, the Court reasoned that the
first approach went beyond the constitutional requirements. 37 In
rejecting the latter approach, the Court reasoned that it would be
inconsistent with prior decisions to presume "waiver by inaction" of
a fundamental constitutional right. 38
The Court established the following four-part balancing test: (1)
"the length of the delay;"(2) "the reason for the delay;" (3) '''the
defendant's assertion of his right;" and (4) "prejudice to the defendant. "39 The Court made clear the importance and desirability of
implementing a test that weighed the conduct and assertions of both
the prosecution and the accused40 and suggested that this test be
applied on an "ad hoc basis."41
Although an important factor in the analysis, prior decisions
establish that the length of the delay is not exclusively determinative
of whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. A delay as
long as five years has been allowed42 while a time period as short as
one year and fifteen days has been deemed a violation of the right. 43
Significantly, Barker proclaims that the length of the delay acts as a

33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

ment speedy trial basis even though Bailey raised the due process issue both
on appeal to the court of special appeals and to the court of appeals. Although
the court of special appeals did not address the due process issue, the court
of appeals held that actual prejudice must exist for the Due Process Clause to
take hold. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392,420, 572 A.2d 544, 557, cert. denied,
498 U.S. 841 (1990).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
[d. at 514.
/d. at 516.
[d. at 529-30. See id. at 522-28 for a general discussion and comparison of
the two approaches.
[d. at 529.
[d. at 525.
[d. at 530.

40. [d.
41. [d.

42. The delay in Barker was more than five years between arrest and trial.
43. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) (defendant was arrested August
9, 1972, indicted September 25, 1972, and tried August 22, 1973).
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"triggering mechanism;"44 once the length of the delay reaches a
constitutional dimension, a presumption of prejudice arises and the
remaining factors of the balancing test are applied. 45
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly adopted a statutory
prompt trial provision that is currently codified in article 27, section
591, of the Maryland Annotated Code.46 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland later adopted Maryland Rule 74647 to make mandatory the
prompt trial provisions of section 591,48 which had previously been
construed' as only directory.49 The time limits imposed by these
provisions 50 are not, however, the measure of the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial;51 the provisions were enacted primarily to
protect society's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases. 52
Neither section 591 nor rule 746 confer any benefit on the accused
beyond those already granted by the federal constitution. 53 In fact,
44. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
45. [d.
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992); see supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
47. Maryland Rule 746 is now Maryland Rule 4-271.
48. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). The Hicks court
explained:
By our adoption of Rule 746 in 1977, we intended to supersede the
provisions of § 591(a) and put teeth into a new regulation governing
the assignment of criminal cases for trial. We did so pursuant to the
authority vested in the Court by Article IV, § 18(a) of the Constitution
of Maryland to make rules having the force of law governing "practice
and procedure in and the administration of the . . . courts." ....
The provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding
upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or
bench marks to be observed, if convenient.
[d.; see also State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 95-96, 585 A.2d 833, 834 (1991)
("The dictates of the rule and the statute which it implemented are generally
known as the Hicks Rule. ").
49. See Hicks, 285 Md. at 316, 403 A.2d at 359 (citing Young v. State, 15 Md.
App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, aiI'd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972».
50. Section 591 provides that, absent a showing of "good cause" for postponement,
a criminal defendant must be tried within 180 days from his or his counsel's
first court appearance. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a), (b) (1992). As
originally enacted, the statute required "extraordinary cause" for postponement; the standard was changed to "good cause" in 1980. See State v. Glenn,
53 Md. App. 717; 724, 456 A.2d 1300, 1303-04 (1983). Rule 4-271 provides
that within 30 days of the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213,
a trial date within 180 days of that triggering event is to be set. MD. R. 4271(a)(1). For a more in-depth discussion of Maryland's "prompt trial provisions," see Harold D. Norton, Maryland's Prompt Criminal Trial Provisions:
Hicks and Beyond, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 447 (1985).
51. Hicks, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361.
52. See Hicks, 285 Md. at 316-17, 320,403 A.2d at 359-61.
53. See, e.g., Hicks, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361-62 ("[In finding defendant's
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the Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated specifically that "the
statute and rule were not meant to supersede the constitutional rights
to a speedy trial .... "54
Maryland has therefore adopted the Barker analysis and balancing test when considering the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
tria1. 55 Prior to Bailey, the most extensive application of Barker by
the COlirt of Appeals of Maryland was in Brady v. State5 6 decided
in 1981. In Brady, the court of appeals held that the defendant,
whose prosecution was delayed fourteen months, was denied his right
to a speedy trial because of the prosecution's negligence. The delay
resulted from the State's inability to find Brady, although he was
located somewhere within the state correctional system itself. This
reason for the delay, deemed "prosecutorial indifference" by the
court, was the determining factor in the court's decision to reverse
Brady's conviction. 57
III.

THE INSTANT CASE
Alex Bailey (aka James Vron) was arrested on February 14,
1986, in Montgomery County, Maryland, and charged with violation

54.
55.

56.
57.

incarceration in Delaware to constitute cause to justify a postponement], we
intend no departure from the established law that the mere fact that a defendant
is incarcerated in another jurisdiction does not relieve the State of its Sixth
Amendment obligation to grant the accused his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. ").
State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 96, 585 A.2d 833, 834 (1991).
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 382 A.2d 1053 (finding no violation
of defendant's right to speedy trial despite the fact that hearing on the
defendant's motion to dismiss did not take place until four years after his
arrest, as defendant was in custody of the State of Maryland only 10 of those
days and was incarcerated in other jurisdictions during the remainder of the
period of delay; the prejudice resulting to the defendant was minimal; the
defendant acted affirmatively to delay the trial; and there was little in the way
of assertion by the defendant of his right to a speedy trial), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 839 (1978); Jones v. State, 279 Md. I, 367 A.2d 1 (1976) (reversing
conviction where prejudice resulted from 29 month delay from arrest until
trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977); Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 350 A.2d
640 (1976) (finding that inadvertent five year delay between conviction and
sentencing, although attributable to the State, did not prejudice defendant who
failed to assert his right to a speedy trial; defendant was .not incarcerated
during this period, and may have benefited from the delay in view of the fact
that he was put on probation when he was finally sentenced); Smith v. State,
276 Md. 521, 350 A.2d 628 (1976) (overturning conviction after prejudicial 16
month delay between arrest and trial; delays were attributable to the State and
defendant had adequately asserted his right); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345
A.2d 62 (1975) (reversing conviction where delay was due to tactics of prosecutor and subsequent illness of arresting officer, and defendant's alibi witness
became unavailable due to the delay).
291 Md. 261, 434 A.2d 574 (1981).
[d. at 269, 434 A.2d at 578.
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of the Controlled Dangerous Substance Act. 58 He was subsequently
indicted by a grand jury on March 20, 1986, on charges of distribution of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 59 In May of 1986, the State learned
that Bailey was convicted in absentia in South Carolina on April 8,
1985, of possession with intent to distribute valium and trafficking
in cocaine, for which he received a sentence of ten years. 60
Upon learning of this conviction, the Maryland prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi as to the Maryland drug charges in order to
allow South Carolina to enroll and execute its conviction. 61 The nolle
prosequi was entered on June 6, 1986. 62 Bailey returned to South
Carolina in June, appeared in Charleston County Court on October
16, and on October 22 began serving the previously imposed tenyear sentence. 63
In Maryland, the grand jury returned a new indictment against
Bailey on May 28, 1987. This indictment included the earlier charge
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, plus a new count of
58. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 397, 572 A.2d 544, 546, cert. denied, 498 U.S.
841 (1990). For a complete chronology of events between this date and the
trial in February 1988, see id. at 399-402, 572 A.2d at 547-48.
59. [d. at 399, 572 A.2d at 547.
60. Bailey was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine in Charleston
County, South Carolina on September 5, 1984. On April 8, 1985, he was tried
in absentia (TIA) and found guilty, with a 10 year sentence imposed. [d. at
399, 572 A.2d at 547.
61. In a letter of June 3, 1986, the Assistant State's Attorney informed the defense
counsel as follows:
I have recently been informed by the Solicitor's Office in Charleston, South Carolina, that your client, Alex Ray Bailey, was charged
with trafficking cocaine there in 1984, and in fact was convicted in
September, 1985 in absentia. Warrants based upon this have been on
file at the Montgomery County Detention Center. In order to facilitate
the South Carolina authorities in their efforts to enroll and execute
their sentence, I have decided to enter a nolle prosequi to criminal
number 41284. Your client will then be held under the South Carolina
detainer and extradited. The State of Maryland does not intend to
abandon its prosecution of Mr. Bailey, but we do feel that it would
be appropriate for your client to personally answer these earlier charges
in South Carolina and, if sentenced, to start serving his sentence
there. I feel that that matter should be finally settled prior to the
Montgomery County prosecution for the recent incident of February,
1986. We would then bring your client back to Montgomery County
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
I will enter the nolle prosequi on Friday, June 6, 1986.
[d. at 400, 572 A.2d at 547.
62. [d. On June 9, 1986, Bailey's counsel responded by letter to the State's
Attorney's office objecting to the procedure, and reiterating Bailey's previously
requested demand for speedy trial. [d. at 400-01, 572 A.2d at 548.
63. [d. at 401, 572 A.2d at 548.
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cocaine importation. In July 1987, the State filed a request under
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers64 to obtain Bailey for trial in
Maryland and set a pickup date of August 18, 1987. Bailey fought
extradition, and did not appear in Montgomery County until November 25, 1987.
After a trial date of December 8, 1987, was cancelled because
of a conflict in the defense attorney's calendar, the case was reset
for February 18, 1988. On February 17, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The motion was denied and the
trial proceeded on February 23, 1988. The jury found Bailey not
guilty on the importation charge and guilty on the possession charge. 6s
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the lower
court's conviction in an unreported decision,66 holding that Bailey's
right to a speedy trial had been denied. Petitions by the State for a
writ of certiorari and the defendant's conditional cross-petition were
granted, and the case was certified to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. The court of appeals was to determine whether the court
of special appeals committed error in its determination of the relevant
period by which to measure the length of the delay, and whether
Bailey was denied his right to a speedy trial even if dismissal of the
previous indictment did not toll the relevant period for speedy trial
purposes. 67
The court of appeals upheld the original conviction, finding that
the time delay between the arrest and the trial did not violate Bailey's
right to a fair and speedy trial. Since the delay was over two years
long, however, it was of constitutional dimension,68 thus triggering
an analysis of the remaining factors established by Barker. The court
applied the four-part Barker balancing test and determined that the
unique circumstances involved were sufficient to outweigh any prejudice that may have resulted from the delay. 69
IV.

REASONING AND ANALYSIS

The court reasoned that the prosecuting attorney's use of discretion in entering the nolle prosequi was in good faith, and Bailey
suffered no actual prejudice as a result of the actions of the prosecution. 70 The court looked at the question of prejudice, considering
the three interests which the constitutional guarantee was designed
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616S (1992).
Bailey v. State, 319 Md. 392, 401-02, 572 A.2d 544, 548 (1990).
Bailey v. State, No. 88-737 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989).
Bailey, 319 Md. at 408, 572 A.2d at 551.
[d. at 411, 572 A.2d at 553.
[d. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
[d.
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to protect, and found no evidence that Bailey's defense had been
impaired or that he had suffered any anxiety, concern, or was
otherwise prejudiced while incarcerated or awaiting prosecution. 7)
Even though the court assumed that the, delay of over two years
from arrest to trial was attributable entirely to the State,72 the court
of appeals concluded that Bailey was not denied his right to a speedy
trial. 73
To properly analyze the court's reasoning in Bailey, it would be
instructive to examine it in light of prior applications of the Barker
test. The court in Bailey applied the Barker factors in the following
order:

1.

The Defendant'S Assertion of His Right

While most state courts and many lower federal courts had
previously endorsed some form of demand/waiver rule,74 the Supreme
Court in Barker expressly rejected any such rule that forced a
defendant to demand a speedy trial as a condition precedent to
consideration of the speedy trial right. 7s The Court did acknowledge,
however, that "failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. "76
The court of appeals acknowledged that Bailey had adequately
asserted his right to a speedy trial, even from the early trial stages. 77
71. Id. at 416-19, 572 A.2d at 555-57.
72. Id. at 415, 572 A.2d at 555.
73. Id. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557. Neither the court of appeals nor the court of
special appeals made reference to Maryland's statutory provision for speedy
trial adopted in 1971. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992); see also supra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text. As previously mentioned, a postponement
under this provision may be granted only upon a showing of "good cause."
Id. Good cause will be found if the need to postpone outweighs any detriment
to the public interest. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 229, 458 A.2d 480,
484 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472,
474 A.2d 514 (1984); see also Norton, supra note 50, at 461-67. This balancing
test is applied by the hearing judge, and his decision will not be overturned
absent abuse of discretion. Norton, supra note 50, at 462. Evidently, both
appellate courts accepted that the nolle prosequi was for a legitimate reason
and proceeded to implement and rely entirely on the Barker balancing test.
74. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524 & nn.20-22 (1972). While noting that
most states recognized a "demand" rule, the Court acknowledged that eight
states rejected it at that time: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, New York,
Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 524 n.21.
75. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 532.
77. Bailey, 319 Md. at 409, 572 A.2d at 552. The court stated:
There is no dispute about Bailey's preservation of an assertion of his
right to a speedy trial. As defense counsel told the judge at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss: We are all in agreement that from day one,
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Noting that this assertion was entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether a defendant had been deprived of his right,78
the court of appeals embraced the Supreme Court's reasoning that
the strength of the defendant's assertions would be indicative of the
personal prejudice he was experiencing. The more serious the deprivation of his right to a speedy trial, the more likely the defendant
would complain. 79

2.

The Length oj the Delay
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into
the balance."8o The period of delay, not in itself determinative of
whether the right has been denied, is measured from the time of
arrest or when formal charges are filed against the defendant. 81
The court of appeals was willing to accept, for the purpose of
their analysis, that the entire period from arrest to trial constituted
delay attributable to the prosecution. 82 Being only one part of the
balancing test, the court did not consider a delay of this magnitude
to weigh heavily enough against the State to tip the scales in the
defendant's favor.

3.

The Reason jor the Delay
The court of appeals recognized that, even though the prosecutor
has the right to enter a nolle prosequi, he runs the risk that doing
literally, from the date that I entered my appearance in the District
Court he has iterated, reiterated, and reiterated his demand for a
speedy trial.
Id. at 401 nA, 572 A.2d at 548 nA.
78. Id. at 409-10, 572 A.2d at 552 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32).
79.Id.
80. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
81. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
82. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415, 572 A.2d 544, 555 (1990). The Maryland
appellate courts differed primarily in how they regarded the significance of the
length of the delay. Establishing the relevant time period was the focus of the
court of special appeals' speedy trial determination. Id. at 405-07, 572 A.2d
at 550-51 (quoting Bailey v. State, No. 88-737, slip op. at 1-7 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Apr. 17, 1989». In reversing the circuit court, that court deemed three
time periods to be significant. Bailey, 319 Md. at 405, 572 A.2d at 550 (quoting
Bailey, No. 88-737, slip op. at 1-2). Central to its analysis was the time period
from the dismissal of the original charges on June 6, 1986, until the reindictment
on May 28, 1987. Bailey, 319 Md. at 406, 572 A.2d at 550 (quoting Bailey,
No. 88-737, slip op. at 2-3). The court of special appeals was unwilling to
accept that a nearly one-year delay after a nolle prosequi could ever be justified
in order to obtain an enhanced punishment, noting that the evidence used to
support the conviction two years later turned out to be no more than the same
evidence that supported the initial indictment. Bailey, 319 Md. at 407, 572
A.2d at 551 (quoting Bailey, No. 88-737, slip op. at 5-6).
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so might result in delay and denial of a speedy trial. 83 The court
followed the Barker rationale that "[a] deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily
against the government."84
The State admitted that in dismissing charges they sought two
advantages: (1) to develop an enhanced case of importation of a
controlled dangerous substance against the defendant, and (2) to
allow South Carolina to enroll a conviction in absentia, thus allowing
Bailey to begin serving his time as a South Carolina prisoner. 8S
Although the Court in Barker decries the impropriety of such tactics
by prosecutors, such behavior is only a factor to be considered in
the balancing analysis and is not determinative of whether the right
to a speedy trial has been violated. 86 In balancing the factors, the
court of appeals evidently considered the prosecutor's reasons for
delay in bringing Bailey to trial less egregious than the intermediate
appellate court below.

4.

Prejudice to the Defendant

Reasoning that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice is not
the sole determinant of denial of the constitutional right to a speedy
trial, the Supreme Court in Barker assessed the degree of prejudice
to the defendant in light of the three interests the right to speedy
trial was designed to serve: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3)
limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. s7

83. Bailey, 319 Md. at 412,572 A.2d at 553. The court of special appeals, however,
was much more concerned with the prosecutor's motives in dismissing the
earlier charges and the potential detriment to the defendant's case. Although
consistent with the court of appeals' reasoning that the State had the right to
make this procedural move, the court of special appeals expressly rejected both
of the State's reasons for the dismissal, accepting the defense's argument that
the dismissal was clearly to gain a tactical advantage by the State. Bailey v.
State, .No. 88-737, slip op. at 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989). The
court of special appeals reasoned that "[t]he evidence supporting the conviction
and the evidence supporting the reindictment is the same evidence that supported
the initial indictment. The nolle prosequi here was only for purposes of tactical
delay, not for purposes of building a prima facie case." [d.
84. Bailey, 319 Md. at 412, 572 A.2d at 553 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).
85. [d. at 404, 572 A.2d at 549 (quoting the State's response to the motion to
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial).
86. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 & n.32. "We have indicated on previous occasions
that it is improper for the prosecution intentionally to delay 'to gain some
tactical advantage over [defendants] or to harass them.'" [d. at 531 n.32
(quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971».
87. [d. at 532 (citin~ United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966».
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In Bailey's case, the first interest was not implicated since the
majority of his incarceration prior to the Maryland trial was due to
the previous conviction in South Carolina and not a result of the
Maryland charges. 88 There may have been some anxiety and concern
on Bailey's part since he was aware, as forewarned by the prosecution, that he would face the Maryland charges sooner or later, but
the court felt this to be insignificant under the circumstances. 89 His
greatest concern might have been the prospect of serving his Maryland
conviction consecutively with the South Carolina sentence, but this
would seem a bit premature given the totality of the situation.
The defense also claimed that the third interest of Bailey was
violated in that his defense was impaired due to the loss of a potential
witness. 90 The unavailable testimony evidently would have pertained
to the importation charge that was added upon Bailey's reindictment.
Since the jury subsequently found Bailey not guilty on that charge,
the court of appeals reasoned that it was obvious Bailey was not
prejudiced by the witness's absence. 91 The defense also claimed "actual prejudice" to Bailey in that he was not allowed to enjoy a work
. release program in the South Carolina jail and was kept in "lockdown
status" due to the pending charges in Maryland. 92 The court of
appeals held that such a suggestion was merely speculative and
unsupported by the evidence, and was to be given little weight in
assessing the factor of prejudice. 93
While it is clear that the court of appeals looked to the Barker
balancing test in considering whether Bailey's right to a speedy trial
was denied, actual prejudice to the defendant was obviously the most
important factor in their analysis. Lacking probative evidence that
any significant prejudice actually resulted from the State's actions,
the court was not convinced that Bailey was denied his constitutional
guarantee.
The defendant's remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial
is dismissal of the indictment, a sanction previously depicted as
"unsatisfactorily severe."94 The Supreme Court in Barker considered
this a "serious consequence," possibly allowing a guilty defendant

88. Bailey's time of incarceration in Maryland prior to the nolle prosequi and his
return to South Carolina amounted to less than four months. Bailey, 319 Md.
at 399-402, 572 A.2d at 547-48 (providing chronology of events).
89. Id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 556.
90. Brief of Respondent at 19-20, State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544
(1990) (No. 89-75).
91. Bailey, 319 Md. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
92. Id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 555-56; see also Brief of Respondent at 18, State v.
Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990) (No. 89-75).
93. Bailey, 319 Md. at 417, 572 A.2d at 556.
94. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
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to go free without standing trial. 9S While acknowledging it as more
serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, the
Court stressed that this "is the only possible remedy" when an
accused has been deprived of the constitutional guarantee. 96 By
affirming Bailey's drug conviction after a two year delay, the court
of appeals sends a strong message that it will not grant this "unsatisfactorily severe" remedy unless a defendant can prove that even a
delay of constitutional dimension was actually prejudicial.
Although the court of appeal's analysis is consistent with the
Supreme Court's balancing test in Barker, it represents somewhat of
a departure from the court's earlier application of the test in Brady
v. State. 97 In Brady, the court of appeals was quick to overturn a
conviction where the State's reason for a fourteen month delay was
more akin to negligence than malevolence. In a 4-3 split decision,
the court held that the State's indifference to Brady's whereabouts
was the most important factor in a balancing analysis that revealed
minimal prejudice to the defendant.
As characterized by the Brady dissent, the majority's decision
to overturn Brady's conviction was primarily motivated by "disgust
with the fact that we do not live in a perfect world where one may
know at any given moment precisely who is incarcerated in Maryland."98 This suggests that the majority intended to send a message
to prosecutors that such negligence on the part of the State would
not be tolerated and tips the scales in favor of defendants even when
a. clear showing of prejudice is lacking. Since the only remedy for
denial of the speedy trial right is dismissal,99 the Brady court's
decision to invoke this severe remedy was also a decision to send
this message emphatically.
The court in Bailey, however, indicated that this strict sanction
should be reserved for those instances where ari individual has actually
suffered harm from the delay. The court found no actual prejudice
and accepted the State's obvious attempt to gain a tactical advantage
and a longer delay, attaching minimal significance to any prejudice
Bailey may have suffered. This strongly suggests that the court now
considers the reasons for delay less significant than whether any real
95. [d.

96. [d. The Court quoted Justice White who had noted in an earlier case that
overzealous application of the remedy would infringe "the societal interest in
trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because
of legal error .... " /d. at 522 n.16 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 121 (1966».
97. 291 Md. 261,434 A.2d 574 (1981); see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
98. Brady, 291 Md. at 274, 434 A.2d at 581 (Smith, J., dissenting).
99. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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prejudice has resulted. Absent a showing of actual prejudice, the
court of appeals now appears reluctant to overturn convictions even
when delays are of significant duration.
One commentator has suggested that dismissal for a violation
of the right to a speedy trial should only occur when the defendant's
ability to defend himself is impaired by the delay. 100 The Supreme
Court's opinion in Barker lends support to this suggestion by noting
that of the three interests that the speedy trial right is designed to
protect, possible impairment to the accused's defense is the most
serious. 101 The court in Bailey noted this and, although not expressly
stating that impairment was an absolute prerequisite to a finding of
prejudice, was apparently satisfied that the absence of impairment
in Bailey's case was proof that no prejudice resulted.102
The Brady dissent, joined by Judges Murphy and Rodowsky,
emphasized that an impaired defense was not implicated in Brady's
situation. When asked if the delay in any way damaged the defendant's ability to defend himself, Brady's counsel replied that "[n1o
claim is made to that point of prejudice."lo3 These same judges, now
part of the Bailey majority, likewise were not convinced that Bailey's
defense was impaired by the State's delay, and were unwilling to
allow Bailey to walk free.
Considering the Supreme Court's recognition that delay at times
may even work to the defendant's advantage,I04 it appears that the
Maryland high court's decision to invoke the remedy only where the
defense is actually impaired is more in harmony with the purpose of
the constitutional protection. Judge Cole, who wrote both the majority opinion in Brady and the dissent in Bailey, is correct in his
assessment that the court of appeals has departed from its application
of the test in Brady. It is certainly arguable, however, that this more
narrow application of the Barker test provides more protection to
the general populace of Maryland by "secur[ing] rights to a defendant" while not "preclud[ing] the rights of public justice." lOS As
100. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27
STAN. L. REv. 525, 534-35 (1975). The author suggests that "the primary form
of judicial relief against denial of a speedy trial should be to expedite trial,
not to abort it." [d. at 535.
101. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). The Court noted that "the inability
of the defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses· are unable to recall accurately
events of the distant past." [d.
102. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 417, 572 A.2d 544, 556 (1990).
103. Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 273, 434 A.2d 574, 580 (1981) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) .
1.04. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.
105. [d. at 522 (quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905».
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such, the departure is an improvement over the result reached by the
Brady majority.
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that no one factor
alone is either necessary or sufficient to find that a defendant's rights
have been violated 106 and an affirmative demonstration of prejudice
is not absolutely necessary to prove a denial of the speedy trial
right. 107 Maryland's current analysis, however, seems to indicate that
proof of actual prejudice, though not dispositive, is of greater
importance than any other factor in the balancing test. While the
other factors are still considered in the overall balancing process,
future defendants in Maryland will likely have to provide a strong
showing of actual prejudice in order to establish denial of the right
to a speedy trial.

v.

CONCLUSION

Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland appears to have
shifted somewhat in their assignment of relative weights to the four
factors employed in a speedy trial analysis, the decision in Bailey
follows the premise of the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo: speedy
trial claims are evaluated on an ad hoc basis, and no single factor
is dispositive of denial of the right. While important in the overall
analysis, the length of the delay serves primarily as a mechanism
which triggers application of a balancing test to determine whether
the right to a speedy trial was violated.
While the Maryland courts continue to rely on the Barker
balancing test, proof of actual prejudice to the defendant is the
determining factor in successfully overturning a conviction subsequent
to a pre-trial delay. As the courts take a harder look at whether an
accused has suffered any actual prejudice, the defense must produce
convincing evidence of that prejudice to tip the scales in their favor.
In particular, a showing that the delay has impaired the accused's
ability to present his defense is considered most probative of actual
prejudice.

Joseph W. Rasnic

106. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
107. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).

